In a world of incomplete, unenforceable contracts, both reputation effects and fairness concerns have been suggested as mechanisms capable of avoiding or mitigating market failure. Existing experiments show that labor market failure can be avoided in the absence of individual reputations, apparently due to subjects' other-regarding preferences. This paper introduces a reputation equilibrium with stereotyping (modeled as a belief of type correlation) that predicts cooperation when individual reputations effects are weak. New experiments show that cooperation emerges when such equilibria are likely to exist, but not when existence is unlikely. (JEL C72, C91, D52, D64) Incomplete contracts are frequently observed despite the well-known incentive distortions they create. For example, if a product's quality is not verifiable, sellers have a clear incentive to deliver lower-quality goods. Rational buyers recognize this incentive and adjust their demand accordingly.
a small probability of agents being unconditionally cooperative, Kreps et al. [26] show how false reputation-building by selfish agents can lead to full cooperation in early periods of the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma.
1 For such models to operate, the identity of a non-cooperative agent must be revealed so that appropriate punishments can be effected.
Experimental studies show, however, that cooperation can emerge even when interactions are anonymous. In tests of moral hazard in the labor market by Ernst Fehr and many others (see Fehr et al . [17] and [18] , Charness [9] , Fehr & Falk [15] , Charness et al. [10] , Gächter & Falk [22] , and Hannan et al. [23] , among others,) wages and effort levels are observed substantially higher than the stage game equilibrium prediction even though transactions are anonymous. Furthermore, these studies show little evidence of reversion to the equilibrium in the final periods. Therefore, the authors conclude that fairness norms (such as a natural preference for 'gift exchange') solve the moral hazard problem, not reputation-building.
Not all experimental studies confirm these results. Lynch et al. [27] , Engelmann & Ortmann [13] , and Rigdon [37] find behavior consistent with or converging toward the stage game equilibrium.
Even some studies purporting the existence of fairness preferences include some sessions with strong end-game effects, as in Fehr et al. [18] and Riedl & Tyran [36] . These apparently contradictory results leave open the question of what forces are at work to offset the shirking incentive.
In the current paper, we argue that the reputation-building sequential equilibrium arguments can be applied to the environment with anonymity when we assume firms' beliefs exhibit a sufficient degree of stereotyping. The model, which is developed in Section 1, works as follows. Assume,à la Kreps et al. [26] , that some percentage of workers are unconditional cooperators whose effort is always positively correlated with their wage. If firms believe that worker types are correlatedeven if that belief is empirically unsupported -then a single defection by one worker leads firms to believe that other workers are more likely to be 'selfish' as well. A single defection destroys the reputation of the entire group and causes low wages in all subsequent periods. Depending on the payoff structure and the degree of stereotyping (or, perceived correlation among types,) a selfish worker may prefer to imitate a cooperative worker in early periods of the repeated game, even when his actions are not linked to his identity.
Under the payoff structure used by Fehr et al. [17] and others, selfish workers have an incentive to maintain a group reputation until the very last period (unless firms are very certain a priori that the workers are selfish.) By changing the payoff structure, one can eliminate the existence of such group-reputation equilibria. To test the predictions of this model, a new experimental design is tested in which group-reputation equilibria are highly unlikely to exist. Indeed, we confirm that the substantial levels of cooperation observed by Fehr et al. and 
A Repeated Labor Market
Our goal is to develop a model of rational cooperation in a finitely repeated labor market (which is isomorphic to a sequential prisoners' dilemma) in the absence of individual reputation effects. If each agent knows the identity of their partner but has a sliver of doubt about their partner's payoffs or available strategies, then outcomes other than the stage game equilibrium can be supported as sequential equilibrium outcomes in early periods of the repeated game. This is the insight of Kreps et al. [26] , which was extended by Fudenberg & Maskin [21] , that rational agents may build a false reputation to better their payoffs. As the end of the game approaches, however, such reputations become worthless and rational agents reveal their true type. If the payoffs are favorable enough and the sliver of doubt big enough, false reputations and cooperative outcomes can persist through every period but the last. We refer to this as a full reputation equilibrium. The existence of a full reputation equilibrium is clearly sensitive to the assumption that players know the identity of their partner in every period. The following demonstrates how full reputation equilibria may still exist when agents don't know the identity of their partner, but do hold a 'stereotyping' belief about the group of possible partners.
Assume there are n workers and m firms with n > m. In each period t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T }, each firm is randomly matched with one worker. Matched firms offer a wage w t ∈ {w, w} to their worker, who then responds with e t ∈ {e, e}, where w < w and e < e. Period t payoffs to the firm and worker are denoted by π (w t , e t ) and u (w t , e t ), respectively, where π is decreasing in w and increasing in e and u is increasing in w and decreasing in e. Finally, assume that unmatched workers receive no payoff for that period. The stage game for a matched firm-worker pair (with normalized payoffs) is shown in panel (a) of Figure I . The assumptions on π and u give this game the standard sequential prisoners' dilemma structure.
It is clear that the firm choosing w and the worker always choosing e is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the game and that no other outcome can occur in any Nash equilibrium. If the firm believes the worker is not rational, but instead committed to playing the 'reciprocal' strategy (playing e when w is chosen and e when w is chosen), the firm's best response would then be w.
Thus, the optimal wage offer of the firm depends on his belief about the likelihood that the worker is 'selfish' (she has the payoffs and strategies shown in panel (a) of Figure I ) versus 'reciprocal' (she always plays the reciprocal strategy.) 2 Assume for now that the stage game is played only once and each firm believes their worker is reciprocal with probability p and selfish with probability 1 − p. This game of incomplete information is shown in panel (b) of Figure I . If the firm offers w it will clearly receive e from either type of worker.
If it offers w, it faces a lottery; with probability p it will receive e and with probability 1 − p it will receive e. This lottery is preferred to offering w if and only if pπ (w, e) 
If δ = 1, this inequality is always satisfied. For the remainder of the analysis, we assume δ = 1.
The firm in period T − 1 with belief p T −1 ≥ p * knows that he will receive e if he offers w and e if he offers w, and neither option will affect his beliefs or optimal strategies in the final period. Thus, the firm maximizes his current-period payoff by choosing w T −1 = w. The argument is identical for all previous periods, so, by induction, a full reputation equilibrium exists if and only if p 1 ≥ p * .
Full reputation equilibria are clearly not the only sequential equilibria of this game in which cooperation can emerge for some number of periods. For example, if T = 2, there is a p * * < p * such
, the firm offers w in the first period and the selfish worker plays e with probability just low enough so that p 2 = p * if e occurs. 4 With positive probability, however, the worker chooses e, causing the firm to choose w in the final period. This argument can be extended for any finite T , with the lower bound on p 1 decreasing in T . While such equilibria can be observationally equivalent to a full reputation equilibrium if e happens to occur every period except the last, we focus only on the equilibrium in which e is chosen as a pure strategy in all but the last period. This equilibrium exists only when p 1 ≥ p * .
To generalize the above argument to the case where multiple firms are matched with muliple workers, it becomes necessary to specify whether the random matching of workers to firms is publicly observed or not. If matching is public, each worker's actions are tracked by every firm, so each effort choice of a worker can affect all of her future wages. If the matching is private, firms cannot identify which workers have behaved selfishly. Selfish workers then have less incentive to maintain a false reputation for being reciprocal because their actions are hidden behind the veil of anonymity.
Publicly Observed Matching
If the actions and identities of each pairing are publicly observable, then each firm has a belief p it about each worker i in each period t, and each selfish worker knows that deviating from the full reputation equilibrium will guarantee that she receives w in all future periods. Again, a full reputation equilibrium exists (for worker i) only if p i1 ≥ p * . There is one added wrinkle: Workers face a probability 1 − m/n that they will not be employed in the next period. The quantity m/n now acts as a discount rate on workers' future payoffs. A risk-neutral selfish worker will choose e given w if and only if equation (2) is satisfied, where δ = m/n. Note that if the worker is willing to choose e given w in period T − 1, then she has an even stronger incentive to choose e in any previous period. This proves the following proposition. In this proposition, condition (1) guarantees that firms are willing to offer w to any worker until that worker fails to mimic the reciprocal strategy and condition (2) ensures that a selfish worker is willing to mimic the reciprocal type all the way through period T − 1 even though there is some chance she'll be unemployed in the final period.
Completely Anonymous Matching
We now add two assumptions. First, each firm does not know the identity of any other firm's worker.
Observing that another firm received e in response to w only reveals that there is one selfish worker in the population, but it does not identify her. Second, each firm does not know the identity of its own worker. This assumption is extreme, indeed, but serves two useful purposes. First, it minimizes the possibility of reputation-building. If no firm can track an individual worker's decisions, then a selfish worker has little incentive to build or maintain a false reputation. Second, the assumption makes the specification of firms' beliefs in the sequential equilibrium tractable. Suppose instead that firms know the identity of only their own worker in the current period. Now consider a firm who observes his worker choosing e in response to w, but also observes some other worker choosing e in response to w. His posterior beliefs are now asymmetric across workers. He knows his worker didn't choose e, but for every other worker, the firm believes there is a 1/ (n − 1) chance that they are the deviant. Furthermore, there is some firm who does know the identity of the worker. This creates an asymmetry of beliefs between firms. Specifying beliefs and optimal decisions after such a defection becomes an unmanageable task if the game has more than only a few periods. For these reasons, and in order to match the experimental environment of Section 2, we proceed with both assumptions.
Let the firms' belief in period t that their randomly assigned worker is reciprocal be p t . We refer to this as the group reputation of the workers because, by anonymity, p t completely describes the firms' beliefs about all of the workers. Assume a full reputation equilibrium and, for simplicity of exposition, assume all firms have the same prior p 1 . On the equilibrium path, p t = p 1 since both types of workers behave identically. If one worker deviates in some period t < T , then all firms know there is one worker that is selfish with certainty and n − 1 workers about which no more information has been revealed. 6 The firm's posterior then becomes p t (n − 1) /n. In this environment, one deviation slightly damages the group reputation, but the size of the effect is relatively small and decreases quickly in n.
Along the equilibrium path we know that p T ≥ p * (and thus p 1 ≥ p * ) is necessary for the firms to offer w in period T . But now suppose that p 1 ≥ p * n/ (n − 1). In period T − 1, if a single worker defects, the group reputation becomes p T = p 1 (n − 1) /n ≥ p * . Firms in the final period still believe it sufficiently likely that they will encounter a reciprocal worker and will continue to offer w in the final period. Thus, at least one selfish worker will defect in period T −1. In order for a full reputation equilibrium to exist, p 1 must lie between p * and p * n/ (n − 1). This range is quite small for even moderate values of n.
As in the case of public matching, we still have the added wrinkle that a worker may be unemployed in the final period. Again, the probability of being employed (m/n) must be sufficiently large to induce the worker to cooperate in period T − 1. Combining this with the restriction on p 1 gives the following proposition. 
and (2) m/n ≥ δ * .
Stereotypes
Proposition 2 places a tight restriction on the range of allowable priors. The anonymity of the labor interaction makes the effect of a single worker's defection on the group's reputation relatively small.
This occurs because firms know that the existence of one selfish worker implies nothing about the types of the remaining workers. Suppose instead that firms believe types are correlated. In this case, the defection of a single worker signals not only that there is one selfish worker in the group, but that the other group members are more likely to be selfish as well. If a single worker were to defect, the group reputation would be more severely damaged, making it more likely that firms will switch to offering w in subsequent periods.
We model this type correlation in the following way. Let p 1 be the prior marginal probability that any given worker is reciprocal. Upon observing that one worker i is in fact selfish, the firms' conditional probability that worker k = i is reciprocal becomes Perceived correlation may or may not be consistent with the actual distribution of types. For example, the firms may be initially uncertain about the base rate of reciprocal types in the economy, and observing a selfish type results in a downward shift in the estimated probability that another worker is reciprocal. This rational updating story seems appropriate for a newly established firm hiring from an unfamiliar population of workers, or for an experimental subject matched with a small group of other subjects drawn from a large population. It is perhaps inappropriate for firms with long histories of working with a stable population of potential employees. Regardless of the prior information about the group's characteristics, we can always motivate the perceived correlation as a stereotyping phenomenon. Managers within the firm may use data from individual workers to make (possibly incorrect) inferences about the entire group. In the most extreme case (γ = 1), a single selfish worker causes the managers to conclude that all workers in this population are in fact selfish. We refer to γ as the stereotyping parameter.
Now reconsider the completely anonymous matching case from above. If a single worker defects, the workers' reputation becomes (1 − γ) p 1 (n − 1) /n. When γ > 0, the effect of a single defection on the group reputation becomes more severe. The following proposition formalizes how the stereotyping assumption widens the domain of environments on which full reputation equilibria can exist.
Proposition 3 In the T -period repeated labor market with completely anonymous random matching, public wage and effort choices, and a common knowledge stereotyping parameter γ, there is a full reputation equilibrium (w in every period and e in every period but the last) if and only if (1) each firm's prior belief (p 1 ) satisfies
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For γ sufficiently large, the two conditions of Proposition 3 are identical to those of Proposition 1. Thus, with sufficient stereotyping, the existence of a full reputation equilibrium under completely anonymous matching is identical to its existence under public matching.
Previous experimental studies find support for reputation-building in repeated games (for example, see Camerer & Weigelt [8] , Neral & Ochs [32] , and Andreoni & Miller [3] .) Type heterogeneity is also clearly present in subject populations. Fehr et al. [18] , Fehr & Falk [15] , and others observe heterogeneous behavior in laboratory labor markets, and Hayashi et al. [24] find reciprocal behavior in 68% of second-movers in a one-shot sequential prisoners' dilemma. 8 However, the added correlation in this model either implicitly assumes a particular form of uncertainty about the base rate of selfish types, as mentioned above, or is built on inconsistent, non-Bayesian belief updating. Although either is plausible, research in economics and social psychology verify that such stereotypical beliefs, though inconsistent, can exist in a laboratory setting.
McEvily et al. [30] show that subjects make inferences about the trustworthiness of future opponents based on whether or not past opponents were trustworthy. This effect becomes more pronounced when the opponents are grouped together according to some unrelated criterion. This 'minimal group paradigm' effect is well documented in the social psychology literature (see Tajfel [40] or Tajfel et al. [41] .) Decision makers apparently use past behavior to make inferences about the future behavior of others, especially when there is any reason to think those individuals share a group identity.
The observation that people infer more correlation than is warranted is known in the social psychology literature as 'illusory correlation'. By design, labor market experiments separate firms and workers into groups before the experiment begins, creating an initial identification of group membership among the subjects. A subject acting as a firm may see the group of firms as his 'ingroup'
and the group of workers as the 'outgroup'. This partitioning leads naturally to categorical thinking (i.e., stereotyping) on the part of subjects, even if it is common knowledge that the outgroup is heterogeneous. As Pendry & Macrae [35, p. 926] note, "while true that outgroups are commonly perceived to be less heterogeneous in composition than ingroups, outgroup members nonetheless still display appreciable degrees of variability. Acknowledging the variability of social groups, however, is no antidote to stereotypical thinking." Thus, subjects who are aware of their opponents' heterogeneity may still act in a setereotype-consistent way.
Experimental psychology has established that perceivers are less likely to apply existing stereotypes when the actions of the perceived affect the outcomes of the perceiver (see Neuberg & Fiske [33] or Erber & Fiske [14] .) This would suggest that competitive environments reduce stereotypical beliefs. However, the stereotyping bias returns when cognitive resources are depleted by multiple task requirements. For example, Pendry & Macrae [34] find that subjects who are asked to memorize an 8-digit number are more likely to recall stereotype-consistent information about others. As summarized by Macrae & Bodenhausen [29, p. 105] , "judgement becomes more stereotypic under cognitive load."
Since firms in the experimental labor markets are likely using cognitive resources to watch the market, devise strategies, and compute payoffs, they may be more likely to think categorically about the group of workers even though their payoffs depend on the behavior of workers. Furthermore, Yzerbyt et al. [42] find that when subjects are exposed to information about a group member inconsistent with a formed stereotype, the stereotype shifts more dramatically when the subject is under a high cognitive load. This evidence supports a significant change in beliefs when confronted with a sudden change in behavior by a single worker.
Finally, a study by Ruscher et al. [39] shows that when groups are perceived to be in competition rather than individuals (so, if firms see themselves as collectively in competition with workers,) then subjects tend to pay more attention to stereotype-consistent information regarding individuals in the outgroup and stereotype-inconsistent information for members of their ingroup. Additionally, Rothgerber [38] and Brewer et al. [7] show that "competition has the potential to create stereotypes where none or very few exists before," as summarized by Corneille & Yzerbyt [12, p. 118 ]. This emphasizes that there need not be existing stereotypes of the group of workers for the firms to develop stereotypes when placed in a competitive market situation.
In total, the evidence from past experiments in economics and social psychology provides reasonable support for the assumption that firms in a simple labor market perceive correlation in workers' types.
Experiments

Treatments
The experimental environment of interest, which copies that of Fehr et al. [17] (hereafter FKR),
varies slightly from the model of Section 1. In each period, each firm may announce a wage offer w ∈ {5, 10, 15, . . .} that is displayed to the group of workers. Workers, upon seeing a wage offer, can accept it at any time via verbal announcement. The first worker to accept a given wage is matched with the offering firm and both players are then unable to participate in the market for the remainder of the period. After 3 minutes (or, when all firms have been matched to a worker) the market closes. Unmatched players receive zero payoff. Matched workers then select a level of effort e ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 10}. As in the simple model above, the firms' payoff function π (w, e) is decreasing in w and increasing in e and the workers' payoff function u (w, e) is increasing in w and decreasing in e, with u (w, 0) < 0 when w < 30. It is common knowledge among all subjects that this market will be run 12 times and final subject payoffs will equal the sum of per-period payoffs. The functions π and u are chosen so that the unique subgame perfect equilibrium prediction is (w * , e * ) = (30, 1) in every period if all agents choose strategies to maximize their monetary payoffs.
9
In each experiment, six firms match with nine workers (m = 6 and n = 9.) Two treatment parameters are varied. First, we vary whether or not the identity of matched firms and workers is public. Section 1 highlights how this choice affects the existence of a full reputation equilibrium.
Second, we vary the payoff functions π and u. Of particular interest are the ratios represented by p * and δ * . By Propositions 2 and 3, we can expect a full reputation equilibrium only if δ * ≤ m/n.
Satisfying this, a full reputation equilibrium is most likely to occur (with stereotyping) when the size of interval (4) is maximized, which occurs when p * = (1 − γ) (n − 1) /n. In general, lower ratios imply a greater likelihood that a reputation equilibrium exists. 
Low Ratios, Anonymous Matching (LA)
The first treatment, denoted LA, exactly replicates the design and parameters of Fehr et al. [17] (FKR). Here, the payoffs for matched firms and workers are given by
and
where the cost of effort is given by [24] , then γ ≥ 1/2 is sufficient to generate a full reputation equilibrium.
The functions π l and u l also give each agent particularly strong leverage on the payoffs of their partner. A differential increase in wages hurts the firm by much less than the benefit to its worker.
Similalry, a differential increase in effort helps the firm by much more than the loss to the worker.
At the equilibrium wage-effort pair, a subject increasing his strategy by a small amount helps his partner by roughly ten times more than he hurts himself. To illustrate this point, note that moving from the wage-effort pair (30, 1) to the pair (40, 1) decreases π l from 9.6 to 8. In LA, wage offers are displayed for all agents to see, but the identity of the firm offering each wage is known only to the firms. Similarly, the acceptance of wage offers is public information, but the identity of the accepting worker is known only among the workers. Finally, the effort level decision of each matched worker is made after the market is closed and revealed only to the hiring firm. No other firms or workers observe this decision, and the firm does not learn the identity of its worker. This most closely matches the complete anonymity environment of Section 1, except that effort choices are observed only by the matched firm. 12 In sessions using LA, subjects are paid one U.S. Dollar for every 12 francs earned in the experiment.
Low Ratios, Public IDs (LP)
The second treatment, LP, alters the information structure and payoff conversion rates of LA.
First, all agents observe the player ID number associated with each wage offer and with each worker accepting any given wage offer. Second, effort level decisions are made immediately after a worker accepts a wage offer and this decision is posted (along with the worker's ID number) for all agents to observe. This not only provides information for the formation of individual reputations across periods, but also allows all agents to observe the realization of strategies chosen by each worker given the accepted wage offer before the market closes. By Proposition 1, a full reputation equilibrium will exist as long as p 1 ≥ 0.299. Finally, the conversion rate between experimental currency and actual payoffs is increased to 4 francs per dollar for the workers and 9 francs per dollar for the firms so that consequences of strategy choices have increased saliency.
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The payoff functions of LP are identical to LA (π l and u l ). Thus, the high ratio of the marginal rates of substitution is maintained.
High Ratios, Public IDs (HP)
The third treatment, HP, alters LP to make the payoffs of both agents quasilinear in wages. Identities and actions continue to be public information, but the cost of effort function is tripled to reduce the disparity between the effect of a change in effort on workers and firms. Finally, a linear rescaling of the 'value of effort' to the firms is used to adjust payoffs to match those of the other treatments.
The payoff functions for HP are given by
where v (e) is given in Table A , and
The conversion rate of 12 francs per dollar is used for all subjects.
14 Using (w, e) = (30, 1) and (w, e) = (100, 10), we have p * ≈ 0.855 and δ * ≈ 0.771. Since m/n < 0.771, there cannot be a full reputation equilibrium for any γ because selfish workers will defect in the penultimate period. Even if this condition were satisfied, the restriction on p 1 is quite tight; firms must initially believe that more than 85% of workers are reciprocal. This would not be true, for example, if their prior were consistent with the data of Hayashi et al. [24] . We therefore predict that a full reputation equilibrium will not occur in this environment.
Under the HP payoffs, an agent who increases his strategy to help his partner faces a higher cost, relative to his parter's benefit, than under the LA and LP payoffs. Specifically, moving from (30, 1) to ( 
Design
The experimental design copies as closely as possible that of Fehr et al. [17] (hereafter FKR). The LA treatment is an exact replication of the FKR experiment, differing only in the subject pool and the experimenters, and the LP and HP treatments deviate from this design only as described above.
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Sessions were run in the Laboratory for Experimental Economics and Political Science (EEPS) at the California Institute of Technology using undergraduate students recruited via E-mail. Subjects were randomly divided into two groups of 6 firms and 9 workers. The groups were separated into different rooms, instructions were provided to subjects and read aloud. In the treatment that replicated FKR, the instructions provided by FKR were used. These instructions do not make reference to firms, workers, wages, or effort levels. Instead, subjects were referred to as buyers and sellers and their task was to post prices for a good in a market and choose a 'conversion rate' (rather than an effort level) that affected payoffs. FKR use the term 'conversion rate' to emphasize that sellers, by their choice of e, are choosing the percentage of (126 − w) their buyer will be paid. In HP, the effort level choice can no longer be thought of as a conversion rate on firms' profits, so the generic name 'X' was instead used in the instructions to identify the choice variable.
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Communication by telephone between two experimenters was used to transmit information between rooms during the market stage of each period. All decisions were posted on the blackboard in both rooms. 17 When effort levels were not publicly viewable (treatment LA), the worker wrote her effort decision on an index card that was delivered to the appropriate subject in the other room. In all sessions, the number of periods was common knowledge.
In the first session (S1), subjects participated in the LA treatment for twelve periods. In the second session (S2), subjects participated in LP for twelve periods, while in the third and fourth session (S3 and S4), subjects participated in HP for twelve periods. The fifth session (S5) was divided into two parts. First, HP was played for six periods. Immediately following, the same subjects read instructions and participated in LA for six periods. 18 The treatment-switching design in S5 tests whether or not social norms or reputations developed in HP affect behavior in LA, which can then be compared to behavior in S1. Therefore, session S5 provides a within-subjects test of the two treatments. Each session lasted between 90 minutes and two hours. In sessions S1
and S5, subjects earned an average of $35, while earnings in S2 were as high as $130 due to the reduced exchange rate. In S3 and S4, average earnings were around $25 because cooperation rates were lower.
Results
See Figures III, IV and V for a complete representation of the data from the five experimental sessions. 19 The general pattern of the results is as follows. High wages and effort arise in both the LA and LP treatments, but play switches dramatically to the stage game equilibrium in the final period. In the HP treatment, subjects play at or near the stage game equilibrium in every period. In session S5, low wage/effort choices are observed in the initial HP treatment, but when subjects begin the LA treatment, high wage/effort choices emerge. Wages and effort again drop in the final period. These results imply that the payoff parameters are responsible for the emergence of cooperation and not the anonymity of interactions. In Section 3 we discuss how these results compare to the predictions of the models of Section 1 and to previous explanations of cooperation in similar experiments.
One of the most robust results across previous experiments is the positive correlation between wages and efforts. This correlation is indicative of either reciprocal-minded subjects or purely selfish subjects imitating the reciprocal type. As expected, this positive correlation is also observed in the current set of experiments.
Result 1 In all treatments in all sessions, wages and efforts of matched firms and workers are positively correlated.
Support. Spearman rank correlation coefficients between wages and effort are calculated for each treatment. For each, the coefficient is estimated to be at or greater than 0.446 and significantly greater than zero. The estimates of the individual coefficients are given in Table A .
Although the wage-effort correlation is inconclusive about the strategies employed, the following set of results provide evidence in support of the full reputation equilibrium model of Section 1. The convergence toward equilibrium in the final period suggests that subjects are playing a repeated game equilibrium with cooperation maintained until the final periods. 21 As Section 1 demonstrates, the anonymity of the LA treatment places tight restrictions on firms' beliefs for such equilibria to exist unless firms perceive correlation among the workers' types. The restriction on beliefs loosens as the stereotyping parameter γ is increased. For sufficiently large γ, any prior belief above 0.299 supports a full reputation equilibrium with w = 100 and e = 10.
Result 2 In the replications of the FKR gift exchange market (treatment
Since FKR and several other studies do not observe a strong convergence to equilibrium in the final period, there clearly exist subject pool effects. The pecentage of reciprocal subjects is apparently lower in the current study, although firms' beliefs must be sufficiently high in both subject pools to generate the cooperative equilibrium in early periods.
The following results indicate that the ability of players to achieve outcomes that Pareto dominate the stage game equilibrium is not robust to the payoff specifications.
Result 3 In HP, the minimum effort level is played more often than all other strategies combined and the effort level regresses to the stage game equilibrium strategy in the final two periods.
Support. Of the 169 effort decisions in HP treatments, 60.4 percent are at e = 1, and over 91 percent of all observations are at effort levels 1, 2, or 3. In the penultimate period, the minimal effort is observed in 12 of the 17 transactions, with an average effort of 1.411. In the final period, every one of the 15 sellers selects e = 1.
Result 4 In HP, the firm's stage game equilibrium strategy (w = 30) is the modal observation and the frequency of this strategy increases with time.
Support. The subgame perfect strategy of w = 30 occurs in 32 percent of the 169 accepted wage offers in treatment LP, which is more often than any other strategy. Wage offers of w ≤ 40 constitute 68 percent of all observations and 86.4 percent of accepted wage offers are no greater than 50.
In session S5, one group of subjects experiences both the HP treatment and the LA treatment.
This session verifies that the change in behavior between treatments is due to the change in the treatment variables and not the particular cohort of subjects who participated in the session.
Result 5 In the treatment-switching session (S5), average wages and effort levels increase after
switching from HP to LA.
Support. To avoid problems with non-stationarities in the time series, each wage and effort from
HP is compared to the wage and effort from LA with the same time identifier (transaction number).
These differences are analyzed using a Wilcoxon signed rank sum test. For wages, the LA values are significantly greater than those from HP, with an estimated z-statistic of 4.693. Similarly, LA effort choices are significantly greater with a z-statistic of 3.652. This result is clearly seen in Figure   V .
The difference in behavior between LP and HP suggests that it is the payoff structure of the game that eliminates cooperative outcomes. Both treatments have identical informational structures, and individual reputation effects could emerge in either. Since the lower bound on firms' beliefs (p * ) is much larger under HP, the observed difference in behavior is consistent with the predictions of the reputation-building model: Cooperation is more likely to emerge when p * is low. Because cooperation also emerges in LA, we know that individual reputations are not necessary for cooperative outcomes.
This supports a model of group reputation formation.
The following two results are not explicitly predicted by the model of Section 1, but we argue below that they are entirely consistent with the reputation-building equilibrium.
Result 6 In a replication of FKR's experiment with public information about identities and histories (LP), wages and effort are significantly greater than in the original design (LA).
Support. Again, wages and effort were paired between sessions according to their time identifier and a Wilcoxon signed rank sum test was performed in the differences. Wages are significantly higher in LP, with a z-statistic of 5.925. Effort is also significantly higher in LP, with a z-statistic of 5.401.
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Recall that the only differences between LP and LA are that the worker ID numbers and effort levels are publicly displayed with each transaction and the payoffs are increased to 4 francs/dollar for the workers and 9 francs/dollar for the firms. Since the reputation model is silent about which values of w and e are chosen by the reciprocal type, the data may suggest that the choice of w and e on which players coordinate varies with the information structure of the game. As this choice is increased from moderate levels, the full reputation equilibrium can be supported by lower prior beliefs of the firm because defecting becomes more costly to the worker. In this way, higher cooperative wage-effort pairs provide a stronger signal of reciprocity. We conjecture that subjects choose these higher wage-effort pairs in situations where reducing the lower bound on firms' beliefs helps to insure that cooperation will be sustained. The LP treatment and later periods of the LA treatment represent exactly those situations.
In the LP treatment, identities and actions are public information. According to the reputationbuilding theory, a worker who defects in this environment fully reveals her type and damages the Similarly, in later periods of the LA treatment, the lower bound on firms' beliefs is higher because selfish workers have an ever-stronger incentive to defect. If a selfish worker were to deviate from the full reputation equilibrium by defecting in an early period, the reputation of the group could be restored by an appropriate choice of mixed strategies where workers choose e with a small probability. 23 If the defection occured late in the game, restoration of the group reputation would be more difficult and, depending on the prior beliefs, may be impossible. By raising the level of cooperation in time, the workers drive down the lower bound on firms' beliefs and insure against isolated defections.
Linking Theory and Experiments
The results of Section 2.3 indicate that behavior approaches the stage game equilibrium prediction across periods in the HP environment, but not until the final period in LA or LP. The remarkable reversion to the stage game equilibrium in the final period of both LA and LP indicates that a simple model of other-regarding preferences may be inadequate to explain these data. The repeated game model of Section 1 provides an explanation for the observed data, but necessary restrictions on parameters may limit the usefulness of those models. The following analysis examines the predictions of the two types of models and their fit to the given experimental data, as well as to the data of earlier experiments.
Inequality Aversion
Although a variety of motives have been identified as possible explanations for a worker to reciprocate (see Charness & Haruvy [11] ,) we focus on two simple models that have been used to predict reciprocal behavior in the labor market context. The (linear) inequality aversion model of Fehr & Schmidt [19] assumes that, in the current environment, each worker's utility function for monetary payouts is of the form
where x i represents i's payout and β i ∈ [0, 1) measures her degree of inequality aversion. 24 A worker with a sufficiently large β i will offer an effort choice above the minimum, regardless of the history of the game. Such worker types are similar to the reciprocal worker defined in Section 1. Using previous experimental data, Fehr & Schmidt [19] argue that there exist a significant number of 'selfish' subjects for whom β i = 0. It seems natural then to assume that firms are uncertain about their worker's type, as in Section 1.
We now examine how an inequality averse worker behaves under the 'high ratio' treatment compared to the 'low ratio' treatments. It may be that the 'high ratio' payoff structure dilutes the inequality aversion effect, causing all subjects to behave as though β i = 0. If this were true, the inequality aversion model could explain the behavior of treatment HP, although it cannot capture the final period crash in treatments LA and LP. Table A shows the Nash equilibrium wage-effort pair of the one-shot game for various values of β i , assuming β i is common knowledge and using the HP payoff structure. As expected, the high ratio treatment dampens the equilibrium wage and effort choices, but the inequality aversion effect is only eliminated for sufficiently small values of β i . [5] analyze the FKR data assuming instead that a fraction α of the workers aim only to minimize |π (w, e) − u (w, e)| and a fraction 1−α behave selfishly by maximizing u (w, e).
Bolton & Ockenfels
Under the FKR payoff structure (u l and π l above), their model predicts that average effort levels are increasing in the wage offers, worker payoffs are increasing in wages, and selfish firms will prefer a wage offer above the reservation wage if α ≥ 0.12. This is similar in spirit to a one-shot version of the model from Section 1, where α replaces p 1 . Switching from the FKR payoff functions to the 'high ratio' specification alters some of the predictions of the Bolton & Ockenfels model. Expected effort is still increasing in the wage offer because inequality minimizing workers continue to behave differently than selfish workers. The payoff to inequality minimizing workers is no longer monotonic in wages for wage offers above 50. Most importantly, the firm's optimal wage choice is above the 
Full Reputation Equilibrium
Fitting the analysis of Section 1 to the experimental environment in which wages and efforts are not a binary choice introduces some degree of freedom in the specification of exactly what constitutes a 'reciprocal' worker. Reciprocal workers could be defined by any increasing function e (w) that specifies how the worker responds to a given wage offer. Selfish workers would then imitate a reciprocal worker by playing e (w) in early periods of the repeated game. Each admissible response function corresponds to a possible behavioral type (in the sense of Fudenberg & Maskin [21] .)
Without an ex-ante justification for ruling out certain behavioral types, the range of equilibrium outcomes becomes large. On the other hand, one could use an existing model of reciprocity or inequality aversion as the pre-specified behavioral type and explore the repeated game equilibria that would emerge. Either the Fehr & Schmidt or the Bolton & Ockenfels model could be used as a justification for why reciprocal types make non-selfish choices. Both predict that, in either treatment, reciprocal types will choose efforts that are increasing in the wage offer. However, neither model in isolation can capture the final-period dynamics observed in Section 2. The reputation-building model with stereotyping adds enough structure to organize these results.
We now look to the experimental data to examine the validity of the reputation-building model with stereotyping. To do this, we develop a simple measure of the probability that a full reputation equilibrium exists given the particular experimental environment. Assuming that the prior beliefs p 1 and the stereotyping parameter γ are independent and uniformly distributed over [0, 1], we can calculate the probability that the conditions of Proposition 3 are satisfied. The exact likelihood of existence at a given choice of w and e is dentoed by L (w, e) . The formula for L (w, e) is derived in the appendix.
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Figure VI displays L (w, e) using the payoffs from the LA, LP, and HP treatments. In any given environment, L (w, e) has an upper bound that is strictly less than one because there are always intervals of p 1 and γ on which existence is impossible. The exact formula for this upper bound is derived in the appendix and depends only on the number of workers n. In the current experiments with n = 9, the maximum probability is approximately 0.41, so the graphs in Figure VI are scaled to this upper bound.
These graphs clearly demonstrate that under the LA and LP treatment payoffs, there are a large number of (w, e) pairs at which a full reputation equilibrium may occur. For many (w, e) pairs, the probability of existence is near the upper bound. Under the HP treatment payoffs, existence can only occur at very few (w, e) pairs, and the probabilities of existence are all relatively small. From this, we see that full reputation equilibria are much more likely to exist in the LA and LP treatments than in the HP treatment, and that the existence of such equilibria is more robust to perturbations of initial beliefs and the choice of (w, e). Charness [9] , Fehr & Falk [15] , Gächter and Falk [22] , and Hannan et al. [23] .) This indicates that most or all workers are indeed reciprocal-minded. However, the data provided by Fehr et al. [18] show strong signs of a final-period crash under the 'no-loss' payoff specification. In particular, 16 out of 26 workers choose e min in the final period after high wages and effort are observed in previous periods. 27 Interestingly, wages remain high in one session despite frequent observations of e min by one player. Although this is not a full reputation equilibrium, it can be supported as a repeated stage game equilibrium if only one worker is truly selfish, γ is low, and p 1 is accurate.
Several experiments have removed the 'no-loss' condition by using quasi-linear profits of the form π (w, e) = ve − w. This does not necessarily imply that reputation equilibria are eliminated. For example, panel (a) of Figure VII shows the likelihood of a full reputation equilibria with the payoffs π (w, e) = 10 − w + 5e and u (w, e) = 10 − e + 5w when wages and efforts are chosen from [0, 10], as in Brandts & Charness [6] . From the figure it is clear that the environment supports reputation equilibria, and in fact the data show that high wages and effort move toward equilibrium on average in the final period. Experimental studies could be used to more directly isolate the stereotype-formation phenomenon.
Scoring rules could be used to elicit beliefs from subjects who purchase from a sequence of sellers under moral hazard. Functional MRI studies may provide neurological evidence for stereotype formation and its economic consequences. A variety of tests could be constructed to further examine the validity and limits of the stereotyping assumption. On the theoretical front, the introduction of perceived type correlation into the standard repeated game model could be applied to a wide range of domains with incomplete information and individual anonymity, providing new explanations for observed cooperative behavior in repeated interactions.
A Appendix
Here we derive the probability that a full reputation equilibrium exists. Assuming p 1 and γ are independent random variables with densities f and g on [0, 1], respectively, then given m and n (the number of firms and workers, respectively,) the probability that both conditions of Proposition 3 are satisfied is given by
where p * and δ * are functions of w and e and depend on the choices of π and u. 30 The integral expression can be simplified to
Note that if g (γ) = 0 for all γ < 1 − p * n/ (n − 1), then this expression reduces to 1 − F (p * ).
If we assume p 1 and γ are uniformaly distributed, the expression reduces to
Integrating and simplifying gives the formula
which represents the probability that a full reputation equilibrium exists. Including the case of high δ * , we have
For a given n > 1, the p * that maximizes this strictly concave function is p * = 
Notes
1 This analysis was generalized by Fudenberg & Maskin [21] . 2 We could instead assume that the reciprocal type receives payoffs of one if her observed action is consistent with reciprocation and zero otherwise. Doing so introduces other Nash equilibria into the game that are not subgame perfect. It also complicates the specification of beliefs in the sequential equilibrium of the repeated game. The current assumption is equivalent to restricting attention to sequential equilibria in which the reciprocal type plays the reciprocal strategy with probability one. 3 The fact that the reciprocal type cannot play e in response to w means that the firm's belief must update to p T = 0 upon observing e. 4 With the normalized payoffs of Figure I ,
, which is strictly less than 1 when p 1 < p * .
5 Formal proofs are available in a working paper version.
6 This is true even though deviations are a zero-probability event because reciprocal types are unable to deviate. with workers, other firms will know that a selfish worker exists and will then choose w in period T as well. 8 In Hayashi et al. [24] , 11 of 18 American subjects and 15 of 20 Japanese subjects play the reciprocal strategy.
Zero of 13 American and 3 of 25 Japanese second-movers cooperate after observing defection, providing evidence that cooperation in this game is almost always due to reciprocity and not pure altruism. 9 There is another subgame-perfect equilibrium in which no firm ever offers a wage and no worker ever accepts a wage. As in FKR, we set π (w * , e * ) > 0 and u (w * , e * ) > 0 so that subjects strictly prefer the equilibrium with trade over the no-trade equilibrium.
10 This point will be formalized in Section 3.
11 As in FKR, subjects actually chose e/10 instead of e. We scale by 10 in this manuscript for clarity of exposition.
12 This shouldn't affect the predictions of Proposition 3; see footnote 7.
13 Subjects were not aware of the conversion rate difference during the experiment.
14 The function v (e) can be approximated by 11/40 + 2.9e/40. To make the decision similar to that of the FKR design, subjects actually chose values of v (e) from the table, which listed the appropriate value of c (e) for each possible v (e). 15 The HA treatment, which would be the least conducive to reputation effects, is not tested. The model clearly predicts that if cooperation does not emerge in HP (which is what we observe,) then it will not emerge in HA.
specific information or instructions about the second treatment until the conclusion of the first. 19 In session S4, two subjects acting as workers had not been matched with many wage offers in the first several periods and consequently had accumulated very little earnings by the 7 th and 8 th periods. These subjects, informed that they would not have to pay their losses to the experimenter, began to accept the smallest possible wages and offer the highest possible effort in an attempt to create maximal wealth for the (anonymous) firms. After 4 such actions, one worker was removed from the experiment and the other immediately (and voluntarily) stopped participating.
Interviews with subjects revealed that they were frustrated by the open-outcry, first-come, first-served nature of the market, which was perceived as unfair because louder, faster subjects were more likely to get matched with a firm.
These 4 data points are removed from analysis, but likely affected beliefs in the market for the remainder of the session. 20 One worker accepted a sub-equilibrium wage offer in the final period. This was clearly an error made in his haste to participate in the market. 21 The reputation-building model predicts that wages should be high in the final period. The drop in wages can be predicted by assuming that workers are also unsure about the firms' types. If firms with low beliefs pretend to hold high beliefs, or if non-stereotyping firms pretend to use stereotypes, then it is the firms who may surprise the workers in the final period with a low wage offer. 22 That this difference is more significant than that documented in the previous result is also a consequence of the larger sample size. 23 The optimality of these mixed strategies is mentioned in Section 1 where sequential equilibria other than the full reputation equilibria are discussed. This is also observed in Kreps et al. [26] . 24 The term α i max {x j − x i , 0} is omitted because the worker will always prefer to reduce effort when the firm's payoff is greater than its own. Thus, the model never predicts x j > x i . See Fehr & Schmidt [19, p. 849 ]. 25 It is interesting to note that if L (w, e) > 0, then (w, e) Pareto dominates (w, e). 26 The justification for using a no-loss profit function is that behavior in the domain of losses often differs from behavior in the domain of positive payoffs. 27 This fact is deduced from the data in the appendix of the paper. 28 Individual data is not presented, so it is unclear whether the group collectively chose slightly lower strategies or if the separation predicted by the group reputation model obtained. 29 This fact is found in the data provided in the appendix of the paper. 30 If the upper limit of integration is smaller than the lower limit, we assume the integral takes a value of zero. Figure VI: The probability that a full reputation equilibrium exists for each (w, e) pair in (a) the LA and LP treatments and (b) the HP treatment. Graphs are scaled to the maximum possible probability. 
Figure VII: The probability that a full reputation equilibrium exists for each (w, e) pair in (a) the 'excess supply of labor' treatment of Brandts & Charness [6] , (b) Riedl & Tyran [36] , (c) Rigdon [37] , and (d) Lynch et al. [27] , where 'effort' is a binary choice. Graphs are scaled to the maximum possible probability. Table 3 : Equilibrium wage-effort pairs using payoffs from the LA, LP, and HP treatments for various parameter values β in the worker's inequality averse utility function.
